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Abstract
We investigate the effect of house prices on household borrowing using administrative
mortgage data from the UK and a new empirical approach. The data contain household-level
information on house prices and borrowing in a panel of homeowners, who refinance at regular
and quasi-exogenous intervals. The data and setting allow us to develop an empirical approach
that exploits house price variation coming from the idiosyncratic and exogenous timing of re-
finance events around the Great Recession. We present two main results. First, there is a clear
and robust effect of house prices on borrowing. Second, the effect of house prices on borrowing
can be explained largely by collateral effects. We study the collateral channel through a multi-
variate and non-parametric heterogeneity analysis of proxies for collateral and wealth effects.
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1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that house prices are strongly correlated with household borrowing and
consumption over the business cycle. These comovements have existed for a long time and were
especially strong around the Great Recession. We illustrate this in Appendix Figure A.I, which
shows the evolution of house price growth, consumption growth, and mortgage debt growth in
the United States and the United Kingdom over the last four decades. Motivated by such macro
patterns, a leading narrative about the Great Recession argues that house price swings drive bor-
rowing and consumption (for example Mian & Sufi 2011, 2014; Mian et al. 2013; Kaplan et al. 2017).
In this paper we revisit this question using a new approach, providing evidence both on the effect
of house prices on borrowing and on the underlying mechanisms driving the effect.
This is an area where causal identification is particularly difficult, because house price variation
is endogenous and compelling quasi-experiments are difficult to find. The time series evidence in
Figure A.I does not have a causal interpretation, a point emphasized by Campbell & Cocco (2007)
and Attanasio et al. (2009, 2011). Much of the recent literature instead uses variation in house price
growth across geographical areas, which raises concerns about confounding regional shocks (such
as shocks to local income expectations) that drive both house prices and the outcome of interest.
This requires the use of an instrument for regional house price growth, but compelling instruments
are difficult to find.1
Motivated by these challenges, we consider a different setting and a different approach to study
the effect of house prices on borrowing. We examine the borrowing decisions of home refinancers
using administrative data on the universe of mortgage contracts in the United Kingdom from
2005-2015. Our data and setting offer three main advantages. First, the dataset has information on
individual house prices from mortgage appraisals by lenders. We present evidence showing that,
in the United Kingdom, mortgage appraisals provide unbiased measures of actual house prices.
Second, the data has a panel dimension as many homeowners refinance several times during the
11-year window we consider. This results from the fact that refinancing is a frequent phenomenon
1Much recent work instruments regional house price growth using a topography-based measure of housing supply
elasticities, namely proximity to mountains and oceans that restrict supply (as constructed by Saiz 2010). The idea is
that regional housing markets are exposed differently to demand shocks because of their topography. A debate about
this instrument highlights potential issues with the exclusion restriction and defiers (see for example Davidoff 2013,
2016).
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in the United Kingdom, because long-term fixed interest mortgages are not available (see Best et al.
2018). The panel dimension of the data allows us to control for a rich set of fixed effects that deal
with the standard confounders discussed in the literature. For example, confounding regional
shocks will not be a threat to identification here as we control for county-by-time fixed effects.
Third and finally, the institutional setting helps with identification. Most mortgage products in
the United Kingdom come with a relatively low interest rate for a short time period, typically 2-5
years, followed by a much higher reset rate. This creates a strong incentive to refinance around the
onset of the reset rate, and we show that most homeowners do in fact refinance around this time.
This implies that the timing of refinance is determined by past contract choices, namely the dura-
tion of the initial low interest rate in the last contract.2 These mortgage institutions, combined with
the large house price swings over the period we consider, create a potential quasi-experiment. Re-
financers face very different house price shocks depending on whether they refinance before, dur-
ing, or after the housing crisis, and this timing is determined largely by a mortgage contract choice
made in the past. Loosely worded, we use the Great Recession interacted with pre-determined,
idiosyncratic contract choices as a quasi-experiment for house prices.
We present two main sets of results. The first set of results concerns the impact of house prices
on homeowner borrowing. While such borrowing effects are interesting in their own right (see e.g.,
Mian & Sufi 2011), they are also indicative of the potential consumption effects of house prices and
they relate to the same underlying mechanisms. We find clear evidence that house price appre-
ciation induces homeowners to increase borrowing by extracting equity from their home. The
elasticity of borrowing with respect to house prices lies between 0.2-0.3 and is robust across a
range of specifications. We use both fixed effects and instrumental variables (IV) regressions. In
our preferred specifications, the elasticity is identified from within-individual variation in house
price growth. This variation comes from homeowners who refinance at least twice and experience
different house price shocks due to how their (pre-determined, quasi-exogenous) refinance tim-
ing interacts with the housing cycle. Unlike previous studies, many of our results are based on
non-parametric, graphical analyses in which we do not impose any a priori assumptions on func-
tional form. A new finding from this approach is that the borrowing elasticity is constant across
the distribution of house price changes.3
2This quasi-exogeneity of refinancing stands in contrast to the U.S. setting where the decision to refinance is endoge-
nous to factors such as income shocks, liquidity needs, and the market interest rate (see Hurst & Stafford 2004).
3The finding of an isoelastic relationship motivates our focus on log-log specifications through most of the paper,
because the log-log coefficient is a direct estimate of the elasticity (in robustness checks, we also report estimates of
the marginal propensity to borrow). Reporting the elasticity also eases comparisons to the part of the literature that
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The second set of results concerns patterns of heterogeneity and mechanisms. The two main
reasons why house prices may affect borrowing are wealth effects and collateral effects (see for
example Sinai & Souleles 2005; Berger et al. 2018).4 All else equal, the wealth effect should be
larger for older homeowners who have short horizons and are therefore in a position to cash in on
their housing wealth, while the collateral effect should be larger for more leveraged homeowners.
The existing literature has tried to distinguish between different mechanisms by studying such
patterns of heterogeneity (Campbell & Cocco 2007; Attanasio et al. 2009, 2011). A challenge for
such exercises, however, is that different dimensions of heterogeneity are highly correlated. For
example, older homeowners have shorter horizons and more asset risk, but are also less levered,
and so it is not clear if the age profile is picking up wealth or collateral effects.
We resolve this issue through a multivariate and non-parametric analysis of heterogeneity in
the elasticity of borrowing with respect to house prices. We consider four dimensions simulta-
neously: loan-to-value (LTV), age, income, and income growth. Our approach shows how the
borrowing elasticity varies across bins of a given dimension, while simultaneously allowing for
differences in the elasticity across bins of the other three dimensions. The striking finding from
this analysis is that there is essentially no heterogeneity in any dimension except one — loan-to-
value — but this dimension is strong. More levered households are more responsive to house
prices, with borrowing elasticities around 0.6 at loan-to-value ratios above 85%. By contrast, the
age profile is completely flat after controlling non-parametrically for the other dimensions. The
strong relationship between borrowing elasticities and LTV is consistent with evidence on sub-
prime borrowing in the United States (Mian & Sufi, 2009, 2011), and it indicates that the collateral
channel is the main mechanism behind house price effects.
The U.K. mortgage market offers an additional way of investigating the collateral channel,
arising from the presence of observable credit constraints that depend on collateral. Specifically, the
U.K. mortgage interest rate schedule features numerous discrete jumps (notches) at critical LTV
thresholds.5 We argue that these notches are ‘soft’ collateral constraints, because they represent
discrete increases in the cost of borrowing due to a lack of collateral (i.e. due to a high LTV ratio).
estimates the elasticity of total borrowing, as opposed to only mortgage borrowing, because there is no mechanical
reason why these elasticities should differ. A possible economic reason for the elasticities to differ is that mortgage debt
is generally cheaper than other forms of consumer debt, in which case households may shift debt onto their mortgage
following a house price increase. Such shifting would lead our elasticity of mortgage borrowing to overestimate the
elasticity of total borrowing.
4A third possible reason is the presence of substitution effects on housing consumption, but this channel is shut
down here as we consider refinancers who stay in their existing houses.
5Best et al. (2018) describe and analyze these notches in the United Kingdom, while DeFusco & Paciorek (2017)
investigate a notch in the U.S. mortgage interest rate schedule.
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The only difference between soft borrowing constraints and the hard borrowing constraints famil-
iar from theoretical models is the size of the notch: A hard borrowing constraint is one where the
borrowing cost jumps to infinity at a threshold.
For some households, house price growth raised their collateral sufficiently to move them
past a lower notch, and thereby reduced their cost of borrowing. For other households, the same
change in their house price did not move them past a lower notch, because their initial LTVwas lo-
cated further from a notch. Hence, the U.K. setting allows us to identify exactly those households,
for whom house price growth raised their available collateral in a way that relaxed their cost of
borrowing. We find that the borrowing elasticity depends critically on whether the underlying
price variation relaxed collateral constraints (by pulling homeowners down to lower notches), re-
inforced collateral constraints (by pushing homeowners up to higher notches), or left collateral
constraints unchanged. In particular, the elasticity is high (around 0.5) among homeowners whose
collateral constraint was relaxed by house price growth, and it is zero among those whose collat-
eral constraint was reinforced. Taken together, the heterogeneity analyses using LTV and notches
provide evidence that collateral-based changes in the cost of credit play an important role in driv-
ing the borrowing response to house price growth.
Given that much of the recent literature focuses on the United States, it is natural to ask if
our results are transportable to the U.S. setting. Three points are worth highlighting. First, our
empirical design — relying on within-individual variation — identifies micro elasticities rather
than macro elasticities. This implies that the various reasons whymacro elasticities can vary across
economies (such as the underlying source of the house price shock as highlighted by Kaplan et al.
2017) are not relevant for assessing external validity in our setting. Second, the majority of the
U.S. literature uses cross-regional variation in house prices. Regional effects may differ from our
micro elasticities due to local general equilibrium effects, which may amplify or moderate the
responses of individual households. Third, institutional differences between the United States
and the United Kingdom may lead to differences in the true elasticity of borrowing with respect
to house price growth. For example, the elasticity may differ because the fixed costs of equity
extraction are higher in the United States. Importantly, however, our empirical approach allows us
to accurately capture the entire household mortgage borrowing response to house price changes
in the United Kingdom.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature, Section 3 describes
the institutional setting and data, Section 4 analyzes the sources of house price variation used
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for identification, Section 5 presents results on the effect of house prices on borrowing, Section 6
presents results on heterogeneity and mechanisms, and Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Important contributions byMian & Sufi (2011) andMian et al. (2013) have shaped the recent debate
about the effect of house prices on household debt and consumption. Their findings suggest that
house price booms and busts were key determinants of U.S. economic growth before and during
the Great Recession. To estimate the effect of house prices, Mian & Sufi (2011) andMian et al. (2013)
rely on regional house price variation and use housing supply constraints due to topography (from
Saiz 2010) to build an IV strategy. Kaplan et al. (2017), Aladangady (2017), and Stroebel & Vavra
(2018) use similar IV strategies to study the impact of house prices. Other papers that use regional
variation include Campbell & Cocco (2007), Attanasio et al. (2009), Disney et al. (2010b), Gan (2010),
Case et al. (2013), and Bhutta & Keys (2016). Studies by Muellbauer & Murphy (1990) and Carroll
et al. (2011), on the other hand, rely on pure time-series variation to estimate the effect of house
price growth on borrowing and consumption. Finally, studies by Bostic et al. (2009), Disney et al.
(2010a), Disney & Gathergood (2011), and Cooper (2013) use individual, self-reported house price
assessments to estimate the effect of house prices on borrowing and consumption.
Table 1 summarizes existing estimates of how house prices affect borrowing and consumption.
The estimates fall in a relatively wide range. A challenge to interpreting the existing results is the
possible bias from confounding shocks that are correlated with house price variation across time,
regions, and individuals. A number of papers highlight this identification challenge. Attanasio
et al. (2011) argue that macroeconomic shocks and expectations explain the correlation between
house prices and borrowing. Hurst & Stafford (2004) show that the timing of refinancing is en-
dogenous to household liquidity shocks. Agarwal (2007) finds that households who overestimate
their house price are more likely to extract equity and to default on loans. Davidoff (2013, 2016)
points out that topography-based instruments are based on a strong exclusion restriction in the
U.S. context, because they largely capture variation between the coasts (such as San Francisco, Los
Angeles, and New York City) and the interior (such as Wichita, Dayton, and Tulsa).
Motivated by these concerns, we develop an approach that relies on idiosyncratic variation
in the timing of refinance events driven by pre-determined mortgage contract durations. Our
use of contract durations to form an IV strategy is similar in spirit to the pioneering study by
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Card (1990), who used variation in the duration of Canadian union wage contracts to identify
unexpected changes in real wages. Also related, Di Maggio et al. (2017) analyze mortgage contracts
that adjust the interest rate after a pre-determined duration, but their research question (the impact
of interest rates rather than house prices) and empirical strategy is different from ours.
An additional contribution of our paper is that we make no a priori assumptions about the
functional form between house prices and borrowing. Using our rich data and non-parametric
graphs, we show that the relationship is roughly isoelastic. Our non-parametric and multivariate
heterogeneity analysis is also new to the literature and informs an unresolved debate. Previous
studies have found a negative age profile of wealth effects, which is inconsistent with standard
life-cycle models (Attanasio & Weber 1994; Attanasio et al. 2009, 2011; Mian & Sufi 2011; Bhutta
& Keys 2016; Berger et al. 2018). We show that the negative age profile reflects the confounding
effects of collateral and that the true age profile is flat.
Finally, our paper highlights the importance of collateral constraints in driving the effect of
house prices on borrowing. A number of the papers listed in Table 1 report that more leveraged
households respond to house price growth more strongly. We add to these findings with our
multivariate heterogeneity analysis, which shows the effects of leverage are not driven by other
dimensions of heterogeneity correlated with leverage. A related literature analyzes the effect of
relaxed access to housing collateral on borrowing (Leth-Petersen 2010; DeFusco 2018), retail sales
(Abdallah & Lastrapes 2012), consumption (Agarwal & Qian 2017), and entrepreneurship (Jensen
et al. 2014).6 Compared to these studies, our approach allows us to examine not only the effects of
a collateral shock, but more generally how households respond to a house price shock, including
tests for the wealth channel. In addition, we use a large and representative sample (the popula-
tion of U.K. mortgagors), study the effects of both relaxing and tightening collateral constraints,
and introduce the analysis of notches as new test of the collateral channel. Complementing our
findings, two recent papers argue that LTV-dependent borrowing constraints affect households in
response to other shocks, such as debt reductions (Ganong & Noel 2018) and changes in mortgage
payments (Di Maggio et al. 2017).
6The identifying variation in these studies comes from government policy. For example, DeFusco (2018) analyzes the
expiration of resale price caps on houses in a county in Maryland, which increased the housing collateral available to
homeowners. His estimates for the marginal propensity to borrow out of housing collateral lie between 0.04 and 0.13.
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3 Institutional Setting and Data
3.1 U.K. Mortgage Market
The U.K. mortgage market has several institutional features that make it an excellent laboratory
for investigating the relationship between house prices and homeowner borrowing. In contrast to
the U.S. mortgage market, long-term fixed-rate mortgages are unavailable in the United Kingdom.
Almost all mortgage products feature a relatively low interest rate for an initial period, followed
by a penalizing reset rate.7 The initial rate typically has a duration of 2-5 years and this rate may
be either fixed or floating. The reset rate lasts for the remainder of the mortgage’s duration and is
always floating. The reset rate is penalizing in the sense that the same bank almost always offers
an identical mortgage product with a much lower rate. For example, at current rates a refinancer
could lower her interest payments bymore than 200 basis points (without altering the amortization
schedule or other features of the mortgage) by refinancing to avoid the penalizing rate.
In addition to the penalizing reset after the end of the initial low-interest period, most mortgage
contracts feature large early repayment charges, typically 5 or 10 percent of the outstanding loan.
These charges make it very costly to refinance or adjust borrowing before the end of the initial
period.
The combination of penalizing reset rates and heavy early repayment charges implies that
households have strong incentives to refinance right around the end of the initial duration. To
confirm that households act on these incentives, Figure 1 shows the distribution of time between
mortgages among refinancers in our data. The distribution features large spikes in refinancing ac-
tivity around 2, 3, and 5 years after the previous mortgage, consistent with the fact that these are
the most common durations on offer. The lightly shaded bars indicate the fraction of households
in each month that refinance around the end date of their initial low-interest duration (within a
window of 2 months before and 6 months after the end date). The figure demonstrates that the
vast majority of households refinances around the time that the initial duration ends.8
This institutional setting has the following key advantages for our empirical approach. First,
the fact that refinancing occurs around predetermined dates makes the time of refinance poten-
7More than 90% of mortgage products feature such reset rate structures (see for example MoneyFacts.co.uk).
8How do borrowers choose their mortgage’s initial duration? The main determinants in this choice are interest
rates and expectations thereof. For example, a two-year initial duration will offer a lower interest rate than a five-year
initial duration, but the five-year product hedges against interest rate increases in the remaining three years. The choice
between the two will be determined by, among other things, risk preferences. Our empirical approach will be able to
deal with unobserved heterogeneity in preferences for low-interest durations.
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tially orthogonal to individual circumstances. This contrasts with the U.S. setting where the deci-
sion to refinance or take out home equity loans is likely to be correlated with unusual consumption
and borrowing needs (see Hurst & Stafford 2004). Second, the fact that refinance events are fre-
quent allows us to observe the same homeowner refinancing several times, facilitating the use of
panel data methods. Third, the frequency of refinancing also implies that the market for home
equity loans is minimal in the United Kingdom. As households are only a few years away from
refinancing at any given time, home-equity based borrowing is done almost exclusively through
equity extraction at the time of refinancing. Finally, it is worth highlighting that mortgage debt
comprises nearly 90% of all household debt in the United Kingdom. Thus studying borrowing
responses in the mortgage market gives a nearly complete view of household borrowing behavior.
When households refinance, the lender appraises the house value and this appraisal deter-
mines home equity. The household’s decision about equity extraction then determines the new
debt level, the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, and the interest rate. The interest rate charged on U.K.
mortgages follows a step function with discrete jumps (notches) at certain LTV thresholds. The
most common interest rate notches occur at LTVs of 60%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85%. Figure A.II in
the Appendix shows the average interest rate schedule as a function of LTV across all mortgage
products (see Best et al. 2018 for details).9 The overall level of the interest rate schedule depends on
a number of mortgage contract characteristics (including the duration of the initial interest rate),
but all contracts feature notches at critical LTV thresholds. These interest notches introduce a form
of ‘soft’ collateral constraints that depend on collateral values: borrowing costs jump sharply as
the LTV ratio exceeds — and the collateral therefore falls below — the critical thresholds.10 House
price growth reduces a homeowners’s LTV ratio, allowing her to borrow at a lower interest rate if
it pulls her across interest notches. We will utilize this institutional feature to devise a test for the
collateral channel.
3.2 House Price Measurement
We measure house prices based on lenders’ house value appraisals. There are a number of useful
reasons for this. First, these appraisals provide us with house price information at the individual
level. Second, appraisals take place at every refinance event, providing us with several obser-
vations of house prices for each house-homeowner pair. Third, the appraisal provides the exact
9Best et al. (2018) provide a bunching analysis of borrowing responses to these interest notches.
10Alongside these notches, there is also a hard collateral constraint as only a handful of mortgage products are cur-
rently available at LTVs exceeding 90%.
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house price measure used by the lender to determine collateral, the LTV ratio, and the interest rate.
Hence, for capturing the collateral effect of house prices, there is no measurement error in the price
measure we use.
Nevertheless, a potential concern with our house price measure is the presence of appraisal
bias. A literature has shown that mortgage appraisals feature systematic upward bias in the United
States (for example Ben-David 2011; Agarwal et al. 2015, 2017), which may reduce the suitability
of appraisals for capturing the true wealth effect of house prices in that setting. However, such
appraisal bias does not seem to be a problem in the United Kingdom, as we demonstrate in two
ways. First, while we do not observe actual market prices for refinanced properties, we do observe
market prices (along with appraisals) when properties are purchased and the first mortgage is
originated. Hence, Figure 2 shows a histogram of the difference between the purchase price and
the appraisal for transacted properties. The difference is zero for the vast majority of transactions,
showing that appraisals line up with the actual price for newly purchased homes.
However, appraisal bias may be more acute for refinances than for first mortgages, as there
is no purchase price to anchor the appraisal for refinances. This motivates our second test in
which we compare actual purchase prices (for transacted properties) with appraised prices (for
refinanced properties) over time. The results are shown in Figure 3. Panel A plots the raw time
series of actual and appraised prices. Taken at face value, this panel suggests that there is bias:
appraised prices are slightly higher than purchase prices on average, and the appraised prices are
too smooth during the financial crisis. But such a comparison does not account for the fact that
the composition of properties in the two series is different, and that the composition of each series
changes over time. To be able to accurately compare the two series and their changes over time,
Panel B presents regression-adjusted price series in which we control non-parametrically for two
observables: the age of the homeowner and the postcode of the property. Specifically, we run the
following regression separately for the purchase and appraisal price series:
Pi = ∑
t
βt · I [quarteri ∈ t] + ∑
k
γk · I [agei ∈ k] + ∑
p
λp · I [postcodei ∈ p] + νi, (1)
where the first term includes a full set of quarter dummies, the second term includes dummies for
twenty quantiles of the age distribution, and the third term includes dummies for twenty quan-
tiles of the postcode-level distribution of house prices. Specifically, the last term is based on the
average house price of each 6-digit postcode, and it includes dummies for the postcode’s quantile
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position in the distribution of postcode-level prices. This term controls for the fact that the quality
of neighborhoods that feature high or low activity differs across the two series and changes over
time.
The plotted values in Panel B are the coefficients on the quarter dummies from equation (1),
adding a constant equal to the effect of the average age and the average postcode (in each series
separately). We see that, with non-parametric controls only for age and neighborhood, the two
series track each other closely throughout the period and the recession is now clearly visible in
the appraisal series. In other words, the differences in Panel A were due to differences in sample
composition rather than real appraisal bias. We therefore conclude that appraisals are a good
reflection of true property prices in the U.K. market.11
3.3 Data
The data come from a new and comprehensive regulatory dataset containing the universe of mort-
gage product sales. These data are collected by the U.K. Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and
available to restricted members of staff at the FCA and the Bank of England. This Product Sales
Database (PSD) has information on all completed household mortgage product originations from
April 2005, but does not include commercial or buy-to-let mortgages.12
Regulated lenders are required to submit quarterly information on all mortgage originations.
The data include a range of information about the mortgage such as the loan size, the date the
mortgage became active, the house price appraisal, the interest rate charged during the introduc-
tory period, whether the interest rate is fixed or variable, the end date of the initial duration (the
time at which the higher reset rate starts applying), whether mortgage payments include amor-
tization, and the mortgage term over which the full loan will be repaid. The data also include a
number of borrower characteristics such as age, gross income, and whether the income is solely or
jointly earned.13
Another useful feature of the PSD is that it contains information on whether the household is a
refinancer. Using information about the characteristics of the property and the borrower, refinanc-
11Further evidence against consequential appraisal bias is that the equity extraction elasticity remains stable when
controlling for fixed effects for month, household, and county x year, as well as a number of time-varying household
characteristics (results in Section 5.1). Typical sources of appraisal bias are that certain households or banks tend to
demand biased appraisals or that region- or household-specific income shocks lead to biased appraisals. The control
variables account for all these possibilities.
12See https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/product-sales-data for officially published, high-level data.
13Full details of the dataset can be found on the FCA’s PSD website.
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ing households can be matched over time to construct a panel. As noted above, since refinancing
is a regular occurrence in the U.K. mortgage market, this provides us with multiple observations
for the same household over the 11 years of the sample. Using our new panel, we can compute
a range of useful household-level statistics including house price growth, mortgage debt growth,
amortization, and equity extraction/injection.
Overall, the PSD contains around 14 million mortgage observations. Around half of these
observations are mortgages for new house purchases, while the other half are refinancing events.
Since we need to calculate the house price change and equity extracted for our analysis, we can
only use refinancing observations where we observe a previous mortgage event (either the house
purchase or a previous refinancing event) by the same household for the same property. Our
estimation sample is therefore a subset of the refinancers in the PSD, for which we have at least
two mortgage observations. Some of our specifications below control for individual fixed effects,
so they identify solely off refinancers with at least three mortgage observations (for which we can
calculate the house price change and equity extraction for at least two refinancing events).
Table 2 summarizes the data. Panel A compares descriptive statistics for home buyers (column
1), all refinancers (column 2), refinancers in our estimation sample with at least two mortgage
observations in the PSD (column 3), and refinancers in our estimation sample with at least three
mortgage observations in the PSD (column 4). There are no significant differences between any of
the groups in the share of couples, income, income growth, interest rate, and house price. Some
differences between buyers and refinancers are to be expected. For example, buyers tend to be
younger and have higher LTV ratios.
Panel B of Table 2 reports statistics for the 1.38 million observations in our estimation sample
with at least two observations, split into three subsamples. As discussed above, practically all
mortgages in the United Kingdom have an initial duration with a favorable interest rate, after
which a higher reset rate kicks in. This gives a strong incentive for refinancing around the onset of
the reset rate. The subsample in column 1 of panel B includes the 0.48 million observations where
we know refinancing took place “on-time” (defined as between 2 months before and 6 months
after the reset rate onset), while column 2 includes the 0.28 million observations where we know
refinancing took place “off-time”. For a large part of the sample, 0.61 million observations, we do
not observe when the reset rate kicks in, because lenders were not always required to report this
statistic to the Financial Conduct Authority. We summarize these observations in column 3. There
are no significant differences across the three groups in any of the observables.
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4 House Price Variation
There is large house price variation in the data. Figure 4 shows the distribution of house price
growth between refinance events for homeowners in our estimation sample. To measure individ-
ual house price growth, the sample conditions on observing homeowners at least twice. The first
price observation for each homeowner may come either from the first mortgage in the house or
a refinance, while subsequent price observations always come from refinances. The distribution
shows that house price growth lies between -30% and +60% across refinance events, giving us lots
of variation toworkwith. We note that there is some round-number bunching at zero price growth,
suggesting that some lenders set the new house price equal to the old house price whenever the
two are very close (see Kleven 2016 for a discussion of round-number bunching).
While there is large house price variation in the data, the challenge is that much of it may be
endogenous to demand factors that impact our outcome of interest. Our approach starts by con-
trolling for obvious confounders by absorbing a rich set of fixed effects. Individual fixed effects
control for time-invariant individual preferences for borrowing, month fixed effects control for
time-varying macro factors that affect borrowing, while county-by-year fixed effects control for
local, time-varying shocks to borrowing demand. Specifically, ‘counties’ are defined as local plan-
ning authorities (or councils), of which there are more than 400 in the United Kingdom and 32 in
London alone.
Figure 5 shows the distribution of residual house price growth, after absorbing the fixed effects
described above. Allowing for individual fixed effects on house price growth gives an R-squared
of one among households with just two mortgage observations (one price growth observation),
so the figure considers the sample of homeowners observed at least three times. Panel A shows
the raw distribution of house price growth in this subsample as a benchmark (it looks similar to
the raw distribution in the previous figure), while Panel B shows the residualized distribution.
Importantly, there is large remaining house price variation even after controlling for fixed effects,
between -20% and +20% across refinance events.
What drives this residual variation? In general there can be two sources of remaining varia-
tion. The first is that different properties experience different price growth within counties, so that
county-by-year fixed effects do not fully absorb the housing cycle. This arises because of varia-
tion across neighborhoods within counties, variation across property types within neighborhoods,
or completely idiosyncratic variation driven by features of the specific house. On the latter, note
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that the value of a specific house may increase due to home improvements undertaken by the
owner, which would not be real house price appreciation. However, the data include an indicator
for home improvement activity, which allow us to deal with this potential issue. Moreover, as
described below, we consider IV specifications that are unlikely to be affected by home improve-
ments.
The second source of variation is idiosyncratic variation in the timing of refinance events rel-
ative to the price cycle. As described above, homeowners have a strong incentive to refinance
around the onset of the reset rate, typically after 2, 3 or 5 years, as these are the most common
products in the market. Hence, the timing of refinance is determined to a large extent by a dura-
tion choice made several years in advance, creating arguably quasi-exogenous variation. Figure 6
illustrates conceptually how this works. It compares two homeowners who start out at the same
time (time 0), live in houses with the same price cycle (the solid blue line), but have different pref-
erences over low-interest rate durations. One homeowner prefers 2-year fixed interest rate loans,
while the other prefers 3-year fixed interest loans. Of course, this difference in duration prefer-
ences will be related to, for example, risk preferences that may themselves impact on borrowing
behavior, but such time-invariant preference heterogeneity is absorbed by the individual fixed ef-
fect. What creates variation here is the interaction of idiosyncratic duration preferences with the
housing cycle: The 2-year person refinances three times over a 6-year period, facing either positive
or negative price shocks at each event, whereas the 3-year person refinances only two times facing
a zero price shock each time. Our empirical strategy exploits this kind of within-person variation
in price growth.
In Figure 7 we illustrate this point using the actual data. The figure plots average house price
growth for homeowners who refinance at different times (in January of different years) by bins of
the duration of their last mortgage. The two panels show the same graphs, but highlight two differ-
ent homeowners who experience very different within-person price patterns due to past duration
choices. The homeowner in Panel A refinances in January 2010 coming out of a 2-year mortgage
chosen in 2008, and refinances again in January 2013 coming out of a 3-year mortgage chosen
in 2010. This homeowner experiences a substantial negative shock the first time around, and a
substantial positive shock the second time around. The homeowner in Panel B also refinances in
January 2010 and January 2013, with the only difference being that in 2010 she was coming out of
a 5-year mortgage chosen in 2005. As a result, this homeowner faces similar positive price growth
in both refinance events. The empirical approach we propose uses this kind of within-person vari-
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ation for identification: i.e., we use the change over time for Person A (who goes from negative to
positive price growth) relative to the change over time for Person B (who goes from positive to pos-
itive price growth). This is a form of triple-differences strategy as we are comparing within-person
changes in price growth.
The exogeneity of this duration-driven variation in house price growth requires that homeown-
ers are not choosing durations in anticipation of future house price growth and future borrowing
needs. For example, if homeowners were choosing 2-year mortgages (rather than 3-year mort-
gages) in late 2005 — anticipating that this would put them at the peak of the boom (rather than
at the bottom of the bust) — to be able to extract more equity for consumption goods in late 2007,
then our estimates would not be causally identified. A sufficient condition for ruling out such
hyper-rational and forward-looking behavior is that homeowners are not able to forecast house
prices with much precision. This assumption seems particularly persuasive around the time of
the Great Recession, and it is consistent with a growing consensus that homeowners tend to have
biased beliefs about future house prices (for example Case & Shiller 1989; Shiller 2007; Case et al.
2012; Kaplan et al. 2017). However, we do not necessarily need bias or irrationality for our strategy
to work; a sufficient amount of house price uncertainty will do.
Another way of gauging the exogeneity of duration-driven house price growth is to check if
duration choices, besides predicting future house price appreciation, predict other things of rele-
vance to borrowing. Hence, Figure A.III in the Appendix shows how much of the residual price
variation (Panel A) and residual income variation (Panel B) can be explained by past duration
choices, having absorbed all the other fixed effects. The figure shows that, while duration choices
are strong predictors of future price growth, they do not predict future income. This lends further
support to our strategy.
We estimate the borrowing response to house price growth using two types of strategies. We
first consider OLS fixed effects regressions, which use all of the residual variation for identifica-
tion. This includes idiosyncratic variation in price growth across properties within counties, and it
includes idiosyncratic variation in the timing of refinance events. As discussed earlier, a concern
with the first source of variation is that it may be partly driven by home improvements. Hence,
we also consider IV regressions in which we construct instruments based on past duration choices
(which determine refinance timing). These results should not be affected by home improvements.
Reassuringly, our OLS fixed effects and IV results turn out to be quite similar.
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5 Do House Prices Affect Borrowing?
5.1 OLS Fixed Effects Specification
The outcome variable in our analysis is the amount of equity extracted at the time of refinancing.
We define this outcome as the log difference between the debt a homeowner holds after refinancing
and the debt a homeowner would have held had she simply rolled over the pre-existing debt when
refinancing, i.e. without extracting or injecting any equity. This outcome is given by logDict −
logDPict, where Dict denotes mortgage debt of individual i in county c at refinance time t and D
P
ict
denotes the pre-determined debt at time t based on past debt choices and amortization.14
To investigate the effect of house price growth on equity extraction, we specify
logDict − logD
P
ict = ∑
j
βj · I [∆ logPit ∈ j] + αi + γt + δct +Xitθ+ νict, (2)
where Pit denotes the price of the house owned by individual i at time t. Note that we consider
a non-parametric specification in which we allow for different bins of house price growth to have
different effects on borrowing, as we do not (yet) want to commit to a specific functional form.
While we primarily consider log-specifications, we will also explore level-specifications and show
that those yield the same qualitative results.15 We allow for individual fixed effects αi, time fixed
effects γt (at the monthly level), and county-by-time fixed effects δct (at the yearly level).16 The
county-by-time fixed effect absorbs regional, time-varying factors (such as local shocks to income
expectations), thus dealing directly with the main confounder discussed in the previous literature.
By allowing for individual fixed effects in a first-differenced equation, this specification has the
form of a triple-differences specification relying onwithin-individual variation in price growth. Xit
includes a number of individual, time-varying variables that could be relevant for debt demand.
We begin the analysis by plotting the estimated coefficients βˆj in different bins of house price
growth, leaving out the other controls in equation (2). Of course, this is equivalent to plotting
the raw averages of equity extraction across the different bins of house price growth. The results
are shown in Panel A of Figure 8. Three insights are worth highlighting. First, overall there is a
14That is, we haveDPict = Dict−1 + (amortization between t− 1 and t).
15The coefficient obtained from a log-specification represents a borrowing elasticity, whereas the coefficient obtained
from a level-specification represents a marginal propensity to borrow (which can be translated into an average borrow-
ing elasticity in the population in order to compare with the log-specification).
16Counties correspond to U.K. local planning authorities (as described above). There is some abuse of notation in
specification (2) as we use t to describe time in both months and years.
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clear positive relationship between house price growth and equity extraction. We see that equity
extraction increases from 5-10% of debt to almost 25% of debt as house price growth changes from
-10% to +40%. Second, there is a strong asymmetry between negative and positive price shocks:
Homeowners increase debt when their house becomes more valuable, but they do not reduce
debt when their house becomes less valuable. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is the
presence of liquidity constraints that prevent homeowners from injecting equity when negative
house price shocks push up their LTV ratios. Third, the average elasticity of borrowing across the
full range of house price growth — obtained from a log-linear specification — equals 0.23. This
elasticity masks the heterogeneity between the negative and positive ranges of house price growth,
with an elasticity of 0.4 in the positive range.
While the raw patterns in Panel A are consistent with an impact of house prices on borrowing,
the relationship may be affected by the confounding effects on borrowing that we have discussed.
For example, the asymmetry between negative and positive house price growth could reflect such
confounders. Therefore, Panel B of Figure 8 considers the results from a richer specification that
controls for individual fixed effects, time fixed effects, and county-by-time fixed effects. Interest-
ingly, the relationship between equity extraction and house price growth is now monotonically
increasing and almost perfectly linear in logs. There is no longer any asymmetry between negative
and positive shocks.17 The average borrowing elasticity is 0.2, slightly lower than the previous
estimate.18
These findings are robust to alternative specifications, which we demonstrate through a num-
ber of checks presented in the online appendix. Figure A.IV shows that the relationship between
equity extraction and house price changes remains log-linear and similarly sloped both in a more
parsimonious specification (dropping county-by-time fixed effects) and in a richer specification
(adding time-varying, household controls).19 While the borrowing elasticity is not affected by
17The asymmetry disappears because this graph plots house price growth conditional on individual, time, and
county-by-time fixed effects. The asymmetry still exists when we look at negative house price growth in absolute
terms. For example, in a specification with all the fixed effects, the equity extraction elasticity among households with
absolute house price gains is 0.28 (0.01), while the elasticity among households with absolute house price declines is
0.01 (0.04). These findings are consistent with the view that liquidity constraints prevent homeowners from injecting
equity when house prices fall.
18Note that all of our estimates include both extensive margin effects (whether or not to extract equity) and intensive
margin effects (how much equity to extract, conditional on extracting). The results in Appendix Table A.I shows that
our estimates are driven primarily by the intensive margin. There is only a very small extensive margin effect of house
price growth on the probability of (strictly) positive equity extraction.
19The household-level controls included in Panel B of the figure are income level, income growth, the last mortgage
interest rate, age of the borrower, a dummy for couples, and dummies for a range of self-reported reasons for the current
and the last refinance.
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these specification changes, it does feature a modest degree of cyclicality as we show in Appendix
Figure A.V. The largest elasticities are observed in the run-up to the recession and the smallest
elasticities are observed in the middle of the recession (see also Guren et al. (2018) for an analysis
of time variation in the effects of house price changes).20
As discussed in Sections 3 and 4, our empirical strategy is based on the idea that the timing of
refinance is quasi-exogenous in the United Kingdom. The argument was that homeowners tend
to refinance around the onset of the reset rate, the timing of which is determined by a duration
choice made in the last refinance event. We showed in Section 3.1 that a majority of homeowners
do indeed refinance around the onset of the reset rate, but we also saw that some homeowners
refinance at other times, typically ‘too late’. There are a variety of reasons why some homeowners
might refinance late — including inattention and financial distress — but whatever the reason,
it raises the concern that such homeowners endogenously tailor the timing of refinance to house
price movements. If this is so, our estimates based on the full sample of refinancers — including
both on-time and off-time refinancers — may be subject to selection bias.
To investigate this selection issue, Table 3 presents estimates of borrowing elasticities across
samples that vary by refinance timing: the full sample in Panel A (summarizing the results al-
ready presented in figures), the sample of on-time refinancers in Panel B, the sample of off-time
refinancers in Panel C, and the sample of refinancers with missing duration information in Panel
D. As mentioned earlier, even though almost all mortgage contracts in the United Kingdom come
with a penalizing reset rate after a certain duration, we do not observe this duration for all home-
owners as it was not always mandatory for lenders to provide it.21 Overall, the table shows that
elasticity estimates are robust: Across all four samples and fixed-effects specifications (columns
2-4), the elasticity varies between 0.17 and 0.27. It is interesting, however, that the elasticity is
somewhat higher in the off-time sample, consistent with a small selection bias.
Given that the existing literature has relied on regional variation in house prices, it is interest-
ing to investigate the implications of using spatial variation in our context. For this exercise, we
use annual house price growth at the county-level as our treatment variable, and we use annual-
20We have also investigated alternative specifications for the outcome and treatment variables. Starting from equation
(2), Figure A.VI shows how the results are affected by moving from a log-specification to a level-specification (Panel A)
and by moving from house prices to housing net worth as the explanatory variable (Panel B). Panel A yields an estimate
of the marginal propensity to borrow (equal to 0.11) and Panel B yields an estimate of the elasticity with respect to
housing net worth (equal to 0.05).
21To be clear, we always observe the actual time between refinance events, it is only the duration of the low-interest
rate period defined in the mortgage contract that we do not always observe. In the sample of homeowners with missing
duration information, the actual time between refinance events features strong bunching at 2, 3 and 5 years, showing
that these households do in fact have a fixed low-interest duration.
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ized equity extraction as our outcome variable (i.e., equity extraction normalized by the number
of years between the current and previous refinance event). As we show in Table A.II, the bor-
rowing elasticities are much larger when estimated from regional variation than those obtained
from our preferred specifications above. This is likely due to the fact that geographic variation in
house prices is correlated with various confounders, and we have no compelling instrument for
geographic house price variation in the U.K. context.22
Finally, we investigate the issue of home improvements. Variation in individual house prices
may be partly driven by idiosyncratic home improvements, which are endogenous and may not
represent true increases in household net worth.23 As a first check, we use self-reported infor-
mation on the reason for refinancing that is available for part of the sample. Appendix Table
A.III shows elasticity estimates in three subsamples: homeowners whose last refinance was for
home improvements (Panel A), homeowners whose last refinance was not for home improve-
ments (Panel B), and homeowners for whom the reason for the last refinance is unknown (Panel
C). The table shows that the estimated elasticity is quite stable across samples. Specifically, among
those who report no home improvement, the elasticities are similar to the elasticities for the full
sample discussed above. This alleviates any major concerns about home improvements, but we
acknowledge that our measure of home improvements is imperfect. Hence, the next section goes
further by presenting IV estimates that cannot be plausibly affected by home improvements.
5.2 IV Specification
Our fixed effects specification relies on two sources of residual variation: (i) idiosyncratic variation
in price growth across houses within counties, (ii) idiosyncratic variation in the timing of refinance
events across homeowners. The first source of variation could be endogenous, for example due
to home improvements (as discussed above) or endogenous selection into neighborhoods. Hence,
in this section we consider an IV strategy that relies solely on variation in the (pre-determined)
timing of refinance events.
We do not want to rely on cross-sectional variation in duration choices, because these are insur-
ance choices that reflect risk preferences and therefore may affect borrowing directly. As discussed
22Hilber & Vermeulen (2016) construct a topography-based housing supply elasticity index for England (a la Saiz
2010), but not for the rest of the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales). However, besides the issues
with the exclusion restriction of such instruments (as discussed above), Hilber & Vermeulen (2016) show that the instru-
ment does not have a strong first stage in the English setting: Topography does not predict house price variation in this
country.
23In particular, home improvements do not increase household net worth unless they increase the house price by
more than the amount invested in the house.
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above, the most compelling source of variation is a three-way interaction between the duration
choice in the last mortgage (say 2-year vs 3-year fixed interest rate), the time of the current refi-
nance event (say 2010 vs 2011), and the regional house price cycle. Hence, we construct instru-
ments based on the interaction between dummies for past duration choices, dummies for the time
of refinance, and dummies for different regions. The first stage of the IV is specified as
∆ logPit = durationit ⊗ regioni ⊗ yeart + durationit + αi + γt (3)
+ durationit ⊗ regioni + durationit ⊗ yeart + regioni ⊗ yeart
+Xitη + µit,
where⊗ denotes the outer product, so that the instrumental variables (durationit⊗yeart⊗ regioni)
include every possible interaction between last duration dummies, year of refinance dummies, and
regional dummies. It is for computational reasons that the instruments are based on year dummies
(rather than month dummies) and region dummies (rather than the more disaggregated county
dummies). Xit is a vector of individual, time-varying control variables.
The second stage of the IV is
logDit − logD
P
it = β · ̂∆ logPit + durationit + αi + γt (4)
+ durationit ⊗ regioni + durationit ⊗ yeart + regioni ⊗ yeart
+Xitη + νit,
where ̂∆ logPit is the predicted house price growth from the first-stage specification (3).
Our richest specification includes fixed effects for household, month, and duration dummies on
their own.24 It also includes fixed effects for all the second-level interactions of the dummies that
we use to construct the instrumental variables. These second-level interactions are fixed effects for
duration-by-region, duration-by-year, and region-by-year. Because we include these control vari-
ables, the identification in the richest specification comes entirely from the three-way interaction
between last duration, region, and year. This overcomes a number of key identification concerns.
The last duration dummies on their own eliminate the possibility that differences in risk prefer-
ences across households drive the effects. The duration-by-region dummies ensure that differences
across regions in the types of households that choose certain durations do not influence the results.
24Household and month dummies subsume region and year dummies, respectively.
19
The duration-by-year dummies eliminate the possibility that time-varying shocks to households
with certain contract duration bias the estimates.
Table 4 shows the estimated elasticities of equity extraction with respect to house price across
four IV specifications. The richest specification in column (4) corresponds to the specifications
shown in equations (3)-(4). There is a non-trivial difference in the estimates between the basic
specification without any controls in column (1) and the richer specifications in columns (2)-(4).
But across the richer specifications, the IV elasticity estimates are stable (around 0.25-0.28) and
marginally higher than the OLS estimates shown earlier. The fact that the IV estimates are higher
is consistent with a (small) bias from home improvements in the OLS estimates: House price ap-
preciation due to home improvements does not represent real appreciation and would therefore
tend to attenuate the OLS estimates. These differences notwithstanding, the IV table confirms the
overall results presented so far: There is a clear positive effect of house prices on borrowing, with
a borrowing elasticity between 0.2-0.3.
6 Why Do House Prices Affect Borrowing?
Having established a causal relationship between house prices and household borrowing, we now
investigate the reasons for this relationship. Berger et al. (2018) provide a theoretical foundation
for the various mechanisms that may be at play. We focus on the two main mechanisms discussed
in the literature.
First, higher house prices increase homeowners’ nominal housing wealth, so that borrowing
responses may reflect the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (Campbell & Cocco 2007;
Case et al. 2013). However, it is not obvious that such changes in nominal wealth translate into
real wealth, as highlighted by Sinai & Souleles (2005). They argue that homeownership provides
a hedge against future housing expenditures for households with long expected tenures in their
existing homes. This implies that house prices have negligible effects on lifetime net worth and
should not affect borrowing. If wealth effects are operational they must therefore rely on expected
changes in real housing consumption over the lifecycle. For example, old homeowners may expect
to downsize or exit the housing market in the near future, in which case house price growth tends
to increase net wealth. Young homeowners, on the other hand, have constant or increasing hous-
ing needs over the foreseeable future, so that the nominal wealth effect of house price growth will
be offset by increases in future housing expenditures. This suggests larger wealth effects for old
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homeowners than for young homeowners. Hence, a number of existing papers assess the impor-
tance of wealth effects by studying heterogeneity with respect to age, but with conflicting results
(Attanasio & Weber 1994; Campbell & Cocco 2007; Attanasio et al. 2009; Mian & Sufi 2011).
Second, housing wealth is the largest form of household collateral. An increase in nominal
housing wealth may therefore relax borrowing constraints, which tend to be proportional to col-
lateral values. The collateral channel has been studied theoretically in the macro housing literature
(for example Aoki et al. 2004; Iacoviello 2005), and it has been argued to be empirically important
for household borrowing in a number of studies (for example Lustig & Nieuwerburgh 2005; Mian
& Sufi 2011; DeFusco 2018).25 The collateral channel implies heterogeneity across leverage ratios:
Households with higher leverage are more collateral constrained, and house price appreciation is
therefore more likely to relax collateral constraints for such households.
In the next section, we start by disentangling wealth and collateral effects based on a hetero-
geneity analysis that uses the power and granularity of our administrative data. We conduct a
multivariate and non-parametric analysis of heterogeneity in the borrowing elasticity along the
main dimensions predicted to determine household borrowing responses. This analysis suggests
that the collateral channel plays a crucial role. We then explore the collateral channel more closely
in the following section, proposing a different method to assess its empirical importance.
6.1 Heterogeneity Analysis
We investigate how the borrowing elasticity varies along four dimensions of heterogeneity: loan-
to-value (LTV), age, income level, and income growth. We consider two types of specifications.
Univariate specifications investigate heterogeneity in each dimension separately, while multivari-
ate specifications allow for heterogeneity in all four dimensions simultaneously. Many dimensions
of heterogeneity are highly correlated, making it difficult to interpret results from univariate het-
erogeneity analyses. Our multivariate specifications allow us to disentangle which dimensions
truly drive heterogeneity in responsiveness, and which dimensions only appear to do so by being
correlated with other relevant dimensions. We estimate specifications of the type
logDit − logD
P
it = ∑
k
∑
j
βkj · I
[
Xkit ∈ j
]
· ∆ logPit + ∑
k
∑
j
λkj · I
[
Xkit ∈ j
]
+ νit, (5)
25The collateral channel has also been shown to be important for business investments and employment (Chaney et al.
2012; Adelino et al. 2015).
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where I
[
Xkit ∈ j
]
is a dummy equal to one when variable k (LTV, age, income, or income growth)
falls in bin j. By allowing for a large set of bin dummies in each dimension (7 LTV bins, 9 age bins,
7 income bins, and 7 income growth bins), and by allowing for these dummies to affect both the
slope and the intercept, our analysis is very non-parametric. Hence, the heterogeneity patterns we
uncover will not be driven by overly restrictive functional form assumptions. We do assume that
the effect of prices on borrowing within dimension k and bin j is log-linear, but this assumption is
a good approximation as we show below. To increase precision, specification (5) does not include
the household and time fixed effects considered in the previous section. It is possible to consider
such an extension and the heterogeneity results turn out to be similar, but standard errors increase
substantially in fixed effects specifications with heterogeneity.
Figure 9 investigates heterogeneity with respect to LTV, which is the main proxy for collateral
effects, as discussed above. We analyze heterogeneity by pre-determined LTV, defined as the LTV
ratio absent any equity extraction/injection and absent any house price growth between the cur-
rent and last refinance event. This LTV ratio is determined by the last choice of mortgage debt and
amortization, along with the last house price. The graphs show a strong monotonic relationship
between the borrowing elasticity and LTV. This holds both when studying this dimension of het-
erogeneity on its own (Panel A) and when controlling for the other dimensions of heterogeneity
(Panel B). In fact, going from the univariate to the multivariate specification hardly affects the re-
lationship, although it increases standard errors somewhat. Hence, homeowners with low levels
of collateral borrow much more against house price increases than do those with high levels of
collateral. The strong degree of LTV heterogeneity is not driven by the log-linearity assumption
made in equation (5), which we show in a fully non-parametric specification in Appendix Figure
A.VII.26
Figure 10 studies the effect of age. These graphs show heterogeneity in the borrowing elasticity
across 5-year bins between the ages of 20 and 60. Panel A presents results without controls for the
other dimensions of heterogeneity. The figure shows the opposite pattern than what is suggested
by standard lifecycle theory: Young households are more responsive to house prices than old
26Appendix Figure A.VII presents non-parametric estimates allowing for a large set of bin dummies for house price
growth (as in the previous section) within three separate LTV categories. The three samples correspond to low-leverage
homeowners (LTV below 60%), intermediate-leverage homeowners (LTV between 60-80%), and high-leverage home-
owners (LTV above 80%). Two insights are worth highlighting. First, the level of equity extraction decreases with
leverage as one might expect: highly leveraged households have a larger stock of existing debt, are more constrained
in their borrowing capacity, and should be on an amortization path over their lifecycle. Second, the slope of equity ex-
traction increases with leverage, consistent with our previous findings on elasticity heterogeneity. That is, homeowners
with high leverage (low collateral) extract less equity, but are more inclined to increase equity extraction when house
prices go up.
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households. A similar pattern of heterogeneity was found by Attanasio et al. (2009) using U.K.
survey data and structural methods. They suggest that this puzzling pattern might arise because
the young tend to be more leveraged than the old, so that collateral effects confound wealth effects
(see Berger et al. 2018 for a similar argument). Panel B investigates and confirms this hypothesis.
It shows that, once we control for LTV (as well as income and income growth), the age profile of
borrowing elasticities is completely flat.
For completeness, Appendix Figures A.VIII and A.IX display heterogeneity across income lev-
els and income growth, respectively. Income is measured at the time of the last refinancing event,
while income growth is measured as the log-change since the last refinancing event. We use dum-
mies representing seven quantiles of the distribution of each of these variables. Once again, we
consider the univariate specification in Panel A and the multivariate specification in Panel B. These
graphs do not show any noticeable patterns of heterogeneity: They are quite flat across both in-
come levels and income growth in both the univariate and multivariate cases.
How should we interpret these heterogeneity patterns? The fact that leverage is such a strong
predictor of borrowing elasticities, even after controlling non-parametrically for other correlated
factors, points to the collateral channel as being central. A few qualifications to this interpretation
are worth mentioning. First, wealth effects may not be the only force driving heterogeneity across
age (even conditional on the other controls), and so the flat age profile does not rule out wealth
effects. Second, wealth effects may themselves lead to heterogeneity across LTV ratios, even absent
a collateral channel. This issue is particularly pronounced in the log-log specification (5). A one
percent increase in the house price represents a five percent increase in housing net worth for a
homeowner at 80% LTV, but only a two percent increase for a homeowner at 50% LTV. Mechani-
cally, there are heterogeneous wealth changes depending on LTV. As a robustness check, we have
therefore tried a level specification as well, finding similar qualitative results. This strengthens the
conclusion that the collateral channel is crucial. Third and last, leverage may be correlated with
unobserved individual characteristics that affect borrowing behavior. A candidate would be self-
control problems. As Mian & Sufi (2011) note, it is likely that households with greater self-control
problems will be observed as credit constrained. However, when augmenting equation (5) with in-
dividual fixed effects (which should pick up self-control problems), we find that our heterogeneity
results are qualitatively unchanged (albeit with larger standard errors).
To conclude, the heterogeneity results suggest that the collateral channel plays a central role
in driving the borrowing elasticity. In the next section, we propose a new test — one that exploits
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discrete changes in the tightness of collateral constraints around interest notches — providing
another piece of evidence in favor of the collateral channel.
6.2 Collateral Channel: A Test Using Interest Notches
The U.K. setting offers a newway of testing the importance of collateral as driver of the borrowing
elasticity. This test is motivated by the insight that a hard collateral constraint can be defined as
a sharp increase to infinity (or a prohibitive level) in the cost of borrowing when collateral falls
below some threshold (or similarly, when LTV surpasses a threshold). Following this definition,
any sharp increase in the cost of borrowing that depends on the amount of collateral is also a
collateral constraint. We view any collateral-based threshold where the cost of borrowing increases
discontinuously, without reaching infinity, a soft collateral constraint.
The U.K. mortgage interest rate schedule features a number of such soft collateral constraints.
These soft collateral constraints are discrete increases in the interest rate (interest notches) at critical
LTV thresholds, as described in Section 3.1. There are interest notches at LTV ratios of 50%, 60%,
70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, and 90%.27 As the LTV ratio surpasses (and housing collateral therefore falls
below) one of the critical thresholds, the cost of borrowing increases sharply. The only difference
between such interest notches and the hard borrowing constraints from theoretical models is the
size of the notch: A hard borrowing constraint is one where the borrowing cost jumps to infinity
at a threshold.28
The direct incentive created by these interest notches is for homeowners to choose LTV ratios
just below one of the thresholds, thus creating bunching in the LTV distribution. Such bunching
represents borrowing responses to the interest rate — rather than responses to the house price —
and was studied by Best et al. (2018) for the United Kingdom and DeFusco & Paciorek (2017) for
the United States. The focus of our exercise here is different. We consider what happens when
house price growth, by increasing the available collateral, moves homeowners above or below
interest notches and sharply changes the cost of borrowing. If collateral constraints play a limited
role in driving the borrowing response to house price growth, households should extract equity to
a similar degree independent of whether house price growth moves their LTV above or below an
interest notch. But if collateral constraints play an important role, equity extraction should differ
depending on whether households’ LTV is moved above or below an interest notch.
27Appendix Figure A.II illustrates most of these notches.
28In fact, the notch at 90% LTV serves as a hard borrowing constraint for most homeowners in our data, because very
few lenders have offered mortgage products above this level since the global financial crisis.
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Figure 11 investigates how the equity extraction elasticity depends on whether the underlying
price variation moves homeowners across notches. We define the collateral constraint as being
relaxed (reinforced) when house price variation moves the homeowner at least one notch down
(up) and thus reduces (increases) the mortgage interest rate. Otherwise, the collateral constraint
is defined as “unchanged.”29 Panel A of the figure considers a baseline specification without any
other controls. This is a specification like equation (5), in which house price growth is interacted
with dummies for the three notch scenarios (relaxed/reinforced/unchanged), but without simul-
taneously controlling for other dimensions of heterogeneity. This analysis shows that the elasticity
is the highest (close to 0.5) when the collateral constraint is relaxed, and that the elasticity is the
lowest (close to zero) when the collateral constraint is reinforced.30 The fact that the elasticity is
essentially zero when the collateral constraint is reinforced may be due to collateral constraints
interacting with liquidity constraints, making it hard for homeowners to inject cash when house
price growth increases their cost of borrowing.
One concern is that the pattern of heterogeneity in Panel A Figure 11 could be due to the fact
that households experiencing negative house price growth do not have a positive elasticity to
house price growth in a specification without controls (as exhibited in Panel A of Figure 8). We
therefore carry out a heterogeneity test using a specification that does not exhibit any underlying
difference between households experiencing positive versus negative house price changes. Panel
A of Appendix Figure A.IV shows that, conditional on household and month fixed effects, house-
holds experiencing positive or negative house price growth respond similarly. Panel B of Figure 11
therefore introduces household and month fixed effects in the specification. This graph confirms
the qualitative relationship between the borrowing elasticity and changes in collateral constraints,
although the effect is smaller than in the baseline specification without fixed effects.
The asymmetric response to relaxing and tightening soft collateral constraints underscores the
importance of the collateral channel. In Appendix B, we develop yet another test of the collateral
channel. There we present an analysis of the dynamic interaction between house price growth
and bunching responses to interest notches, which is consistent with the collateral channel. We
show that, when house price growth pulls homeowners below an interest notch and relaxes their
credit constraint, they respond by increasing their LTV up to the notch. This interaction between
29However, this terminology should not be taken literally: house price appreciation may relax credit constraints even
if it does not move homeowners to a lower interest notch.
30While the figure pools all years 2005-15, we have checked that the patterns are roughly the same inside and outside
the recession years.
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house price growth and bunching responses is again consistent with collateral-based borrowing
decisions.
7 Conclusion
The global financial crisis has reignited a debate about the role of house prices in driving household
borrowing. A first generation of papers following the crisis studied this question using regional
data from the United States and found strong borrowing responses. This paper takes a different
methodological tack to the question. Using administrative mortgage data and unique features of
the U.K. mortgage market, we develop an empirical approach that relies on idiosyncratic variation
in the timing of refinance events driven by pre-determined mortgage contract durations. We find
that a 10% percent increase in individual house prices raises borrowing by around 2-3%.
Our rich dataset also allows us to explore why borrowing responds to house prices. The strik-
ing finding from a heterogeneity analysis is that there is essentially no heterogeneity in any di-
mension except one — loan-to-value — but that this dimension is very strong. In particular, the
elasticity is strongly increasing in LTV ratios, even after controlling non-parametrically for factors
such as age, income, and income growth. This heterogeneity analysis, together with a test us-
ing soft collateral constraints (interest rate notches based on collateral), suggests that the housing
collateral channel is the main driver of the elasticities we find.
The magnitude of these responses, and the importance of collateral constraints, has impor-
tant implications for understanding household behavior in both micro- and macroeconomics. A
growing literature on macro and housing relies on collateral constraints to obtain realistic macro
responses to boom-bust cycles in the housing market. Our findings affirm such theoretical ap-
proaches and provide microeconometric estimates that could help discipline future research in
this area.
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FIGURE 1: HOMEOWNERS REFINANCE AROUND THE ONSET OF THE RESET RATE
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of the time between mortgage financing events. Households who refinance
between 2 months before and 6 months after the onset of their reset rate are shown in light gray, households who
refinance more than 6 months after the onset of their reset rate are shown in black, and households who refinance more
than 2 months before the onset of their reset rate are shown in white. The data in this figure exclude households for
whom we do not observe the date of reset rate onset.
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FIGURE 2: HOUSE PRICES VS APPRAISALS (NEW PURCHASES)
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of within-house differences between the actual house price and the appraisal
price for transacted properties. This includes both first time buyers and home movers, but not refinancers.
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FIGURE 3: HOUSE PRICES VS APPRAISALS (REFINANCED HOMES)
A: No Other Controls
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
300,000
350,000
Av
era
ge
 Ho
us
e P
ric
e
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year
Actual Prices Appraisals
B: With Controls
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Notes: The figure compares actual house prices (for transacted properties) with appraisal prices (for refinanced prop-
erties) over time. Panel A plots the raw time series of actual and appraised prices, obtained by regressing each of the
price series on a full set of quarter dummies and plotting the estimated coefficients. Panel B augments the price re-
gressions on quarter dummies with controls for twenty quantiles of the age distribution as well as twenty quantiles of
the postcode-level price distribution (see equation (1)). The panel plots the coefficients on the quarter dummies, plus
a constant equal to the effect of the average age and the average postcode. This panel shows that, once we correct for
compositional differences in age and postcode, there is no significant appraisal bias.
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FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF RAW HOUSE PRICE GROWTH
Households With ≥ 2 Mortgage Observations
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of raw house price growth among households for whom we observe at least
two mortgage financing events. House price growth is measured as the log change in house prices between the current
and the last mortgage event, multiplied by 100 (i.e., approximately percentage house price growth).
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FIGURE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF RAW VS RESIDUALIZED HOUSE PRICE GROWTH
Households With ≥ 3 Mortgage Observations
A: Raw Price Growth
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B: Residualized Price Growth After Absorbing Fixed Effects
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Notes: The figure shows distributions of house price growth among households for whom we observe at least three
mortgage financing events. Panel A shows the distribution of raw house price growth, while Panel B shows the distri-
bution of residualized house price growth after absorbing household fixed effects, month fixed effects, and county-by-
year fixed effects. In both panels, house price growth is measured as the log change in house prices between the current
and the last mortgage event, multiplied by 100 (i.e., approximately percentage house price growth).
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FIGURE 6: THE TIMING OF REFINANCE EVENTS AND HOUSE PRICE CHANGES
Conceptual Example
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Notes: The figure illustrates, in a conceptual example, how differences in contract duration choices create variation in
house price changes across households. The graph compares two homeowners who start out at the same time (time
0), live in houses with the same price cycle (the solid blue line), but have different preferences over low-interest rate
durations. One homeowner prefers 2-year fixed interest rate loans, while the other prefers 3-year fixed interest loans.
The homeowner in two-year contracts refinances three times over a 6-year period, facing either positive or negative price
shocks at each event, whereas the homeowner in 3-year contracts refinances only two times facing a zero price shock
each time. Our empirical strategy exploits such within-person variation in price growth driven by duration choices.
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FIGURE 7: HOUSE PRICE CHANGES VS LAST DURATION X TIME OF REFINANCE
A: Large Difference in Price Change
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B: Small Difference in Price Change
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Notes: This figure is the empirical counterpart to the preceding conceptual figure. It plots average house price growth
between refinance events for homeowners who refinance at different points in time (in January of different years) by
bins of the duration of their last mortgage (number of years between the current and the last refinance events). The two
panels show the same graphs, but highlight two different homeowners who experience very different within-person
price patterns due to past duration choices. The homeowner in Panel A experiences a large negative price change
in January 2010, followed by a large positive change in January 2013. The homeowner in Panel B also refinances in
January 2010 and January 2013, but experiences similar price changes in the two events. Our empirical approach uses
such within-person variation for identification.
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FIGURE 8: EQUITY EXTRACTION VS HOUSE PRICE GROWTH
A: No Controls
Elasticity = 0.23 (0.002)
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B: Household, Month and County × Year Fixed Effects
Elasticity = 0.20 (0.006)
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Notes: Panel A plots the average equity extraction in different bins of house price growth. Equity extraction is measured
as the log difference betweenmortgage debt after refinancing and the outstanding mortgage debt just before refinancing
(i.e., the debt the household would hold if it simply rolled over the existing mortgage debt at the time of refinancing),
multiplied by 100. House price growth is measured as log change between refinance events, multiplied by 100. Panel
B plots conditional equity extraction in different bins of house price growth based on the fixed effects specification (2).
The plotted points are the estimated coefficients on house price growth dummies, adding a constant equal to the mean
predicted value of equity extraction from all the other covariates. The other covariates are fixed effects for household,
month, and county x year. The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by
household. Each panel reports the average equity extraction elasticity based on a log-linear specification. Panel B shows
an almost perfectly log-linear relationship between equity extraction and house prices, conditional on the covariates.
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FIGURE 9: HETEROGENEITY IN BORROWING ELASTICITY BY LTV
A: No Controls
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B: Controls for Age, Income, and Income Growth
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Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in the equity extraction elasticity by LTV. The heterogeneity analysis is based on a
pre-determined LTV ratio, namely the LTV ratio at time t absent any equity extraction/injection at time t and absent any
house price growth between t and t− 1. Panel A is based on a univariate specification that investigates heterogeneity
by LTV on its own, while Panel B is based on a multivariate specification allowing for heterogeneity in four dimensions
simultaneously: LTV, age, income level, and income growth. The multivariate specification is shown in equation (5).
The dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by household. The figure shows a
strong, increasing relationship between LTV and the borrowing elasticity, consistent with collateral effects.
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FIGURE 10: HETEROGENEITY IN BORROWING ELASTICITY BY AGE
A: No Controls
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B: Controls for Pre-LTV, Income, and Income Growth
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Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in the equity extraction elasticity by age. Panel A is based on a univariate
specification that investigates heterogeneity by age on its own, while Panel B is based on a multivariate specification
allowing for heterogeneity in four dimensions simultaneously: LTV, age, income level, and income growth. The multi-
variate specification is shown in equation (5). The dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors
clustered by household. The figure shows a negative or flat relationship between age and the borrowing elasticity,
inconsistent with wealth effects.
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FIGURE 11: HETEROGENEITY IN BORROWING ELASTICITY BY NOTCHES MOVED
A: No Controls
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
Eq
ui
ty
 E
xt
ra
ct
io
n 
El
as
tic
ity
Relaxed Unchanged Reinforced
Change in collateral constraint
B: Household and Month Fixed Effects
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Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in the equity extraction elasticity by notches moved due to house price changes.
There are interest rate notches at LTV thresholds of 50%, 60%, 70%, 75%, 80%, 85%, and 90%. We define the collateral
constraint as being relaxed (reinforced) when house price variation moves the homeowner at least one notch down
(up) and thus reduces (increases) the interest rate on borrowing. Otherwise, the collateral constraint is defined as “un-
changed.” Panel A shows elasticity estimates when including no other controls, while Panel B allows for household and
month fixed effects. The dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by household.
42
TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF HOUSE PRICES ON BORROWING AND CONSUMPTION
Citation
Country
of Study
Identifying Variation Outcome Main Explanatory Variable
Elasticity
Estimate
Levels
Estimate
Aladangady
(2017)
USA
County housing supply elasticity (Saiz 2010)
interacted with long-term real interest rates
Household consumption
growth
House price growth 0.05
Attanasio et
al. (2009)
UK Regional house price growth
Household consumption
growth
House price growth 0.04 - 0.29
Bhutta and
Keys (2016)
USA Zip-code house price growth
Household mortgage
borrowing growth
House price growth 0.07
Bostic et al.
(2009)
USA
Individual, self-reported house prices from Fed
Survey of Consumer Finances
Household consumption House price 0.04 - 0.07
Campbell and
Cocco (2007)
UK Regional house price growth
Household non-durable
consumption growth
House price growth 1.22 0.08
Carroll et al.
(2011)
USA Aggregate house price growth
Aggregate consumption
growth
House price growth 0.02 - 0.09
Case et al.
(2013)
USA State house price growth
Consumption per capita
growth in the state
Growth in housing market
wealth
0.03 - 0.18
Cooper (2013) USA
Individual, self-reported house price growth
from PSID
Household consumption
growth
Growth in housing equity (house
price net of mortgage debt)
0.06
DeFusco
(2018)
USA
Expiry of caps on the resale price of houses in a
Maryland county
Household borrowing
growth
Growth in the collateralizable
value of houses
0.04 – 0.13
Disney and
Gathergood
(2011)
USA
Individual, self-reported house price growth
from PSID / state house price index / selection
model based on the intention to move house
Household borrowing
growth
House price growth 0.06 - 0.10
Disney et al.
(2010a)
UK
Individual, self-reported house price growth
from BHPS
Household borrowing
growth
House price growth
-0.01 (0.31 for
LTV>80%)
Disney et al.
(2010b)
UK
Residualized county house prices, from an AR(2)
in house prices, conditioning on changes in
household financial expectations
Household consumption
growth
House price growth 0.01
Gan (2010)
Hong
Kong
District house price growth
Growth in household credit
card spending
House price growth 0.17 0.02
Kaplan et al.
(2017)
USA County housing supply elasticity (Saiz 2010)
Non-durable expenditures
growth
Change in net worth due to
house price growth
0.24 - 0.36
Leth-Petersen
(2010)
Denmark
Reform that allowed housing equity to be used
as collateral for consumption loans
Household spending
growth
Growth in the collateralizable
value of houses
0.03
Mian and Sufi
(2011)
USA County housing supply elasticity (Saiz 2010)
Household borrowing
growth
House price growth 0.52 0.25
Mian et al.
(2013)
USA County housing supply elasticity (Saiz 2010)
Growth in household credit
card and auto spending
Change in net worth due to
house price growth
0.6 - 0.8 0.05 - 0.07
Notes: The table lists papers that explicitly report estimates for either the elasticity of borrowing/consumption with respect to house prices (in the column “Elasticity
Estimate”) or the marginal propensity to borrow/consume out of house price changes (in the column “Levels Estimate”).
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TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Buyers vs Refinancers
Refinancers in our Estimation Sample
Buyers Refinancers With ≥ 2
Observations
With ≥ 3
Observations
Age 36.47 42.08 40.85 41.40
(10.13) (9.77) (8.90) (8.06)
Couple 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.56
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Income 55,282.17 55,949.83 57,602.96 58,412.07
(556,583.42) (145,816.42) (81,440.65) (53,227.65)
Income Change (logs) 0.08 0.08 0.06
(0.36) (0.35) (0.32)
Interest Rate 4.39 4.51 3.98 3.84
(1.40) (1.40) (1.50) (1.39)
House Price 229,375.32 248,328.76 256,517.10 266,479.30
(326,209.46) (361,735.65) (187,020.25) (181,871.70)
LTV 70.72 56.53 61.50 59.61
(21.67) (21.80) (18.96) (17.53)
Observations 7,119,807 5,935,441 1,384,346 305,232
Panel B: Refinancers in our Estimation Sample With ≥ 2 Observations
Refinance
On-Time
Refinance
Off-Time
Missing Duration
Age 39.77 41.58 41.37
(8.69) (8.79) (9.04)
Couple 0.55 0.53 0.54
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Income 54,516.32 53,442.66 62,005.61
(48,424.02) (52,355.65) (108,733.95)
Income Change (logs) 0.08 0.11 0.07
(0.31) (0.38) (0.37)
Interest Rate 4.22 3.60 3.97
(1.51) (1.33) (1.53)
House Price 245,030.89 233,110.00 276,638.16
(163,127.94) (158,358.87) (213,289.69)
LTV 61.56 63.04 60.72
(18.30) (19.27) (19.27)
Observations 483,852 288,578 611,916
Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) for different samples. Panel A compares
statistics for home buyers (column 1), all refinancers (column 2), refinancers in our estimation sample with at least
2 observations (column 3), and refinancers in our estimation sample with at least 3 observations (column 4). Panel
B compares statistics for three subsamples of our estimation sample with at least 2 observations: households who
refinance on-time (between two months before and six months after the onset of their reset rate), households who
refinance off-time, and households where we do not observe the onset of the reset rate.
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TABLE 3: EQUITY EXTRACTION ELASTICITIES BY REFINANCE TIMING
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full Sample
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.234 0.208 0.204 0.197
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 1,384,346 1,384,346 1,311,734 1,173,626
Panel B: On-Time Sample
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.245 0.183 0.175 0.166
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 483,852 483,852 460,077 459,571
Panel C: Off-Time Sample
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.317 0.269 0.263 0.252
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 288,578 288,578 274,600 273,727
Panel D: Sample With Missing Durations
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.188 0.201 0.202 0.197
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 611,916 611,916 577,057 440,328
Control Variables:
Month FE × × ×
Household FE × × ×
County x Year FE × ×
Household Controls ×
Notes: The table reports estimates of the equity extraction elasticity across different specifications and samples. Panel
A considers the full sample (summarizing the results of the preceding figures), panel B considers the sample of on-
time refinancers (defined as those who refinance between 2 months before and 6 months after reset rate onset), panel C
considers the sample of off-time refinancers (defined as those who refinance more than 2 months before or more than
6 months after reset rate onset), and panel D considers the sample of refinancers with missing duration information.
Standard errors are clustered by household and shown in parentheses. The household controls included in column (4)
are income level, income growth, the last mortgage interest rate, the age of the borrower, a dummy for couples, and
dummies for a range of self-reported reasons for the current and the last refinance (pure refinance / home improvement
/ debt consolidation / other).
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TABLE 4: EQUITY EXTRACTION ELASTICITIES USING INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.150 0.284 0.268 0.249
(0.004) (0.026) (0.078) (0.076)
Observations 769,494 769,494 769,494 768,042
Control Variables:
Month FE × × ×
Household FE × × ×
Contract Duration FE × × ×
Contract Duration x Region FE × ×
Contract Duration x Year FE × ×
Region x Year FE × ×
Household Controls ×
Notes: The table reports estimates of the equity extraction elasticity using instrumental variables (IV). The instruments
are interactions of dummies for the last mortgage contract duration (time until reset), year, and region. The table
shows IV elasticities from four different specifications, with the richest specification in column (4) corresponding to
equations (3)-(4). The household controls included in column (4) are income level, income growth, the last mortgage
interest rate, the age of the borrower, a dummy for couples, and dummies for a range of self-reported reasons for the
current and the last refinance (pure refinance / home improvement / debt consolidation / other). Standard errors are
clustered by household and given in parentheses. The IV elasticities are close to the elasticities from the OLS fixed
effects specifications.
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Online Appendix (Not for Publication)
A Supplementary Figures and Tables
FIGURE A.I: AGGREGATE HOUSE PRICES, CONSUMPTION, AND MORTGAGE DEBT
A: U.S. House Price vs Consumption Growth B: U.K. House Price vs Consumption Growth
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C: U.S. House Price vs Mortgage Debt Growth D: U.K. House Price vs Mortgage Debt Growth
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Notes: U.S. house price data are from the Federal Reserve Economic Data, U.S. consumption data are from the BEA
National Income and Product Accounts, and U.S. mortgage debt data are from the U.S. Flow of Funds. U.K. house price
data are from the Nationwide Index, U.K. consumption data are from the ONS National Accounts, and U.K. mortgage
debt data are from the Bank of England. All growth rates are log differences multiplied by 100.
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FIGURE A.II: INTEREST RATE SCHEDULE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
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Notes: The figure shows the average mortgage interest rate in the United Kingdom (in %) as a step function of the LTV
ratio, with sharp jumps (notches) at LTVs of 60%, 70%, 75%, 80%, and 85%. The figure plots coefficients (and confidence
intervals) from a regression of the mortgage interest rate on dummies for each 0.25%-bin of the LTV distribution. To
each coefficient, we add a constant equal to the mean predicted value of the interest rate from all the other covariates.
The other covariates include non-parametric controls for lender, contract duration (time until reset), month of refinance,
mortgage type (fixed interest rate / variable interest rate / capped interest rate / other), repayment type (interest only
/ capital and interest / other), term length, reason for refinance, age, couple indicator, and income. The figure is taken
from Best et al. 2018 and further details are provided there.
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FIGURE A.III: THE EXPLANATORY POWER OF MORTGAGE DURATION
A: Duration Explains Future Price Change
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B: Duration Does Not Explain Future Income
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Notes: Panel A plots distributions of residualized house price growth, with andwithout fixed effects for the last contract
duration choice (time until reset) interacted with month and county dummies. The panel shows that past duration
choices can explain a large part of the residual price variation (having already absorbed fixed effect for household,
month, and county x year). Panel B investigates if past duration choices can also explain residual income variation and
shows that it cannot. The fact that past duration is able to predict house price growth, but not other determinants of
borrowing such as income, makes it useful for identifying the effects of house prices on borrowing.
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FIGURE A.IV: EQUITY EXTRACTION VS HOUSE PRICE GROWTH USING ALTERNATIVE CON-
TROLS
A: Household and Month Fixed Effects
Elasticity = 0.21 (0.005)
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B: Household, Month, County × Year Fixed Effects and Household Controls
Elasticity = 0.20 (0.006)
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Notes: The panels plot conditional equity extraction in different bins of house price growth based on the fixed effects
specification (2). The plotted points are the estimated coefficients on house price growth dummies, adding a constant
equal to the mean predicted value of equity extraction from all the other covariates. In Panel A, the other covariates are
fixed effects for household and month. In Panel B, the other covariates are fixed effects for household, month, county
x year, and household controls. The household controls include income level, income growth, mortgage interest rate,
age, a dummy for couples, and dummies for a range of self-reported reasons for the current and the last refinances.
The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by household. Each panel also
reports the average equity extraction elasticity based on a log-linear specification. The figure shows that the relationship
between equity extraction and house prices is almost perfectly log-linear, independent of which controls are included
in the specification. 50
FIGURE A.V: EQUITY EXTRACTION ELASTICITY BY YEAR
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Notes: The figure reports the equity extraction elasticity for each year separately, showing that the elasticity is mildly
pro-cyclical. The specification includes fixed effects for household, month, county x year, and household controls.
The household controls include income level, income growth, mortgage interest rate, age, a dummy for couples, and
dummies for a range of self-reported reasons for the current and the last refinances. The dashed lines represent 95%
confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by household.
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FIGURE A.VI: EQUITY EXTRACTION VS HOUSE PRICE GROWTH USING ALTERNATIVE SPECI-
FICATIONS
A: From Logs to Levels
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B: From House Prices to Housing Net Worth
Elasticity = 0.05 (0.001)
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Notes: The figure investigates if the previous results are affected by moving from a log-specification to a level-
specification (Panel A) and by moving from house prices to housing net worth as the explanatory variable (Panel B). We
specify housing net worth as the house price minus baseline debt, as opposed to current debt, in order to avoid a clear
endogeneity problem. This implies that the two elasticities are identified from the same source of variation in house
prices. Apart from these changes, the panels are constructed in the same way as Figure 8. The alternative specifications
are useful for obtaining different parameters. Panel A yields an estimate of the marginal propensity to borrow (equal
to 0.11), while Panel B yields an estimate of the equity extraction elasticity with respect to housing net worth (equal to
0.05). The elasticity with respect to housing net worth is smaller because housing net worth is only a fraction of the
house price, so any given log-change in house prices translates into a larger log-change in housing net worth.
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FIGURE A.VII: HETEROGENEITY BY LTV NON-PARAMETRICALLY
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Notes: The figure plots average equity extraction in different bins of house price growth and in different bins of pre-
determined LTV. Pre-LTV is defined as the LTV ratio at time t absent any equity extraction/injection at time t and absent
any house price growth between t and t− 1. The figure considers three bins of pre-LTV: low leverage (0-60%), inter-
mediate leverage (60-80%), and high leverage (above 80%). The dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals based
on standard errors clustered by household. The figure shows that the level of equity extraction decreases with leverage,
while the slope of equity extraction with respect to house price growth increases with leverage. This is consistent with
the collateral channel.
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FIGURE A.VIII: HETEROGENEITY IN BORROWING ELASTICITY BY INCOME
A: No Controls
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B: Controls for Age, Pre-LTV, and Income Growth
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Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in the equity extraction elasticity by income level (measured at the time of the
last refinance event). Panel A is based on a univariate specification that investigates heterogeneity by income on its own,
while Panel B is based on a multivariate specification allowing for heterogeneity in four dimensions simultaneously:
LTV, age, income level, and income growth. The multivariate specification is shown in equation (5). The dashed lines
give 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by household. The figure shows that there is relatively
little heterogeneity in the borrowing elasticity by income level.
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FIGURE A.IX: HETEROGENEITY IN BORROWING ELASTICITY BY INCOME GROWTH
A: No Controls
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B: Controls for Age, Pre-LTV, and Income
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Notes: The figure shows heterogeneity in the equity extraction elasticity by income growth (measured as the log-change
since the last refinance event). Panel A is based on a univariate specification that investigates heterogeneity by income
growth on its own, while Panel B is based on a multivariate specification allowing for heterogeneity in four dimensions
simultaneously: LTV, age, income level, and income growth. The multivariate specification is shown in equation (5).
The dashed lines give 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered by household. The figure shows that
there is relatively little heterogeneity in the borrowing elasticity by income growth.
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FIGURE A.X: HOUSE PRICE GROWTH AND BUNCHING AT COLLATERAL NOTCHES
A: Effect of House Price Growth on LTV Distribution
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B: Effect of Equity Extraction on LTV Distribution
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Notes: The figure is based on a sample of households who are pulled down to a lower notch by house price growth. The
two panels show density distributions of three different LTV measures. The pre-LTV = DPit/Pit−1 is the homeowner’s
LTV at time t given past mortgage choices (i.e., the debt level and amortization schedule chosen at time t − 1, not
including equity extraction at time t) and the old house price. The passive LTV = DPit/Pit is the homeowner’s LTV
given past mortgage choices and the new house price. The chosen LTV = Dit/Pit includes any equity extraction made
at time t. The x-axis in each panel represents the distance between a given LTV measure and the next-notch-up from
the passive LTV. Panel A illustrates the effects of house price growth by comparing the distributions of pre-LTV and
passive LTV. This panel shows that house price growth moves homeowners from the positive to the negative range
and eliminates bunching at interest rate notches. Panel B illustrates the effects of borrowing responses by comparing
the distributions of the passive LTV and the chosen LTV. This panel shows that equity extraction largely recreates the
qualitative pattern that existed before house price growth.
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FIGURE A.XI: DISTRIBUTION OF THE CHANGE IN MONTHLY MORTGAGE PAYMENTS
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Notes: The figure is based on a sample of households who are pulled down to a lower notch by house price growth.
It shows the distribution of the difference (in GBP) between the household’s current monthly mortgage payments and
previous monthly payments.
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TABLE A.I: THE EFFECT OF HOUSE PRICE GROWTH AT THE EXTENSIVE MARGIN
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Full Sample
Probability of Positive Equity Extraction 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 1,384,346 1,384,346 1,311,734 1,173,626
Panel B: On-Time Sample
Probability of Positive Equity Extraction 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 483,852 483,852 460,077 459,571
Panel C: Off-Time Sample
Probability of Positive Equity Extraction 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 288,578 288,578 274,600 273,727
Panel D: Sample With Missing Durations
Probability of Positive Equity Extraction 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 611,916 611,916 577,057 440,328
Control Variables:
Month FE × × ×
Household FE × × ×
County x Year FE × ×
Household Controls ×
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of house prices on the probability that households extract equity, across
different specifications and samples. The outcome variable is a dummy for whether equity extraction was strictly
positive (sample mean = 0.81). The treatment variable is house price growth (in logs), the standard treatment variable
used in the main paper. Panel A considers the full sample, panel B considers the sample of on-time refinancers (defined
as those who refinance between 2 months before and 6 months after reset rate onset), panel C considers the sample
of off-time refinancers (defined as those who refinance more than 2 months before or more than 6 months after reset
rate onset), and panel D considers the sample of refinancers with missing duration information. Standard errors are
clustered by household and shown in parentheses. The household controls included in column (4) are income level,
income growth, the last mortgage interest rate, the age of the borrower, a dummy for couples, and dummies for a range
of self-reported reasons for the current and the last refinance (pure refinance / home improvement / debt consolidation
/ other).
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TABLE A.II: EQUITY EXTRACTION ELASTICITIES USING REGIONAL HOUSE PRICE VARIATION
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Effect of County House Price Growth 11.961 4.466 4.538 3.879
(1.146) (0.797) (0.814) (0.724)
Observations 1,309,242 1,309,242 1,309,242 1,308,829
Control Variables:
Month FE × × ×
County FE × × ×
Dummy for Couples, Income Level, Age × ×
Reason for the Current Refinance ×
Notes: The table reports estimates of the effect of county house prices on equity extraction. The outcome variable is
annualized equity extraction, i.e. equity extraction between the current and the last refinance events (in logs) divided
by the number of years between the current and the last refinance events. The treatment variable is the log growth in
average house prices for purchases in the county between the current and the previous year. The reasons for the current
refinance include pure refinance, home improvement, debt consolidation, and other. Standard errors are clustered by
county and given in parentheses. The table shows that the estimated effect of county house price growth is larger than
the equity extraction elasticity reported in the main paper.
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TABLE A.III: EQUITY EXTRACTION ELASTICITIES BY HOME IMPROVEMENT
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Last Mortgage for Home Improvement
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.191 0.183 0.171 0.162
(0.006) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 114,566 114,566 108,237 96,613
Panel B: Last Mortgage Not for Home Improvement
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.213 0.198 0.189 0.184
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 553,200 553,200 524,513 470,038
Panel C: Purpose of Last Mortgage Unknown
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.337 0.240 0.250 0.235
(0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 716,580 716,580 678,984 606,975
Control Variables:
Month FE × × ×
Household FE × × ×
County x Year FE × ×
Household Controls ×
Notes: The table reports estimates of the equity extraction elasticity, splitting the estimation sample by whether the
last equity extraction decision was made for home improvements or not. Panel A considers homeowners whose last
refinance was for home improvements, Panel B considers homeowners whose last refinance was not for home improve-
ments, while panel C considers homeowners whose last refinance purpose is missing in the data. Standard errors are
clustered by household and shown in parentheses. The household controls included in column (4) are income level,
income growth, the last mortgage interest rate, the age of the borrower, a dummy for couples, and dummies for the
various reasons for both the last and current refinance (pure refinance / home improvement / debt consolidation /
other). The table shows that, across the different fixed effects specifications, the estimated elasticity is quite stable across
samples.
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TABLE A.IV: EQUITY EXTRACTION ELASTICITIES BYWHETHER THE FIRST OBSERVATIONWAS
A PURCHASE OR REFINANCE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: First Mortgage Observation is Purchase
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.318 0.240 0.243 0.220
(0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 776,247 776,247 737,798 664,237
Panel B: First Mortgage Observation is Refinance
Equity Extraction Elasticity 0.205 0.173 0.155 0.139
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Observations 580,745 580,745 549,272 488,992
Control Variables:
Month FE × × ×
Household FE × × ×
County x Year FE × ×
Household Controls ×
Notes: Panel A reports estimates of the equity extraction elasticity for households whose first observation in the data
was a purchase, while Panel B reports estimates for households whose first observation in the data was a refinance.
Standard errors are clustered by household and shown in parentheses. The household controls included in column (4)
are income level, income growth, the last mortgage interest rate, the age of the borrower, a dummy for couples, and
dummies for a range of self-reported reasons for the current and the last refinance (pure refinance / home improvement
/ debt consolidation / other).
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B Collateral Channel: A Test Using Interest Notches
This section presents a further test using interest rate notches to investigate the importance of
the collateral channel. Appendix Figure A.X analyzes the dynamic interaction between house
price growth and bunching responses to interest notches. This figure focuses on the sample of
households who are pulled down to a lower notch by house price growth, i.e. households whose
collateral constraint is relaxed. For this analysis, it is useful to formally define three different LTV
concepts. First, we define the pre-determined LTV = DPit/Pit−1 as the homeowner’s LTV at time t
given past mortgage choices (the debt level and amortization schedule chosen at time t− 1) and
the old house price. Second, we define the passive LTV = DPit/Pit as the homeowner’s LTV at
time t given past mortgage choices and the new house price. This is the LTV that would apply
if the homeowner simply rolled over her debt at time t, i.e. if she were “passive.” Third, there is
the actual chosen LTV = Dit/Pit that includes any equity extraction or injection at time t. By this
terminology, the sample in the figure includes borrowers for whom the passive LTV is at least one
notch down from their pre-determined LTV.
The figure shows two panels in which we compare the density distributions of the three LTV
measures defined above. The x-axis in each panel represents the distance between a given LTV
measure (pre-LTV, passive LTV, or chosen LTV) and the next-notch-up from the passive LTV. Panel
A illustrates the implications of house price growth by comparing the distributions of pre-LTV
and passive LTV. Two implications are worth highlighting. First, house price growth moves all
borrowers from the positive range (in terms of their pre-LTV) to the negative range (in terms of
their passive LTV). This follows from the fact that we are restricting the sample to households who
are pulled down by at least one notch. Second, house price growth eliminates all bunching at
interest notches: there is bunching at every notch in the pre-LTV distribution, but no bunching in
the passive LTV distribution.31
How do borrowers respond to the relaxed collateral constraints? Panel B illustrates the impli-
cations of equity extraction behavior by comparing the distributions of the passive LTV and the
final chosen LTV. Strikingly, equity extraction behavior largely recreates the qualitative pattern that
existed before house price growth. We see a dramatic right-shift of the LTV distribution, moving
31The fact that the passive LTV distribution primarily falls in the bins (−5, 0) and (−10,−5), with a discrete drop
between the two, is not a bunching response. It follows mechanically from the x-axis normalization and the fact that
most homeowners are no longer 5 or 10 percentage points away from a notch. Furthermore, notice that bunching in
the pre-LTV distribution is attenuated compared to the actual amount of bunching in the last refinance event due to
amortization between the last and current refinance events.
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borrowers back to around zero or into the positive range, and recreating bunching at notches. In
other words, when house price growth pulls households below one or more notches (Panel A),
most of them extract equity back to the next notch above (at zero) or a higher notch (in the positive
range). Hence, this figure shows how house price growth interacts with bunching responses to
interest notches in a way that is consistent with a collateral mechanism.32,33
32To be clear, what is new in Appendix Figure A.X compared to the more standard bunching analysis in Best et al.
(2018) is the illustration of a dynamic interaction between house price growth and bunching responses.
33It is also conceivable that some refinancers are targeting their previous monthly mortgage payment rather than
borrowing up to a soft collateral constraint. They might do so because of liquidity constraints or behavioral factors (see
Di Maggio et al. 2017 for an analysis of the mortgage payment channel). To explore such effects, Appendix Figure A.XI
shows the distribution of changes in monthly mortgage payments between the last and the current mortgage among
homeowners who are pulled down to a lower notch by house price growth (i.e., the same sample as in Appendix Figure
A.X). In this sample, monthly payments are always reduced by house price growth as it pulls them below interest
notches. But the total net change in the payment depends on other factors such as changes over time in interest rate
levels and the amount of equity they choose to extract. If homeowners extract equity to target an unchanged monthly
mortgage payment, then we would see excess bunching at zero in Appendix Figure A.XI. There is arguably a small
spike at zero, but overall the distribution is quite smooth. This shows that, in this setting, homeowners do not primarily
target an unchanged mortgage payment when choosing equity extraction (while they do target collateral notches as
shown above).
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